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This study tests the hypothesis that an efficient rental market for cropland is a significant 
determinant of agricultural investment in the communal areas of KwaZulu-Natal. An 
efficient rental market creates an opportunity cost for under-utilisation, which tends to 
transfer resources to more effective users. The efficiency of a rental market is compromised 
by the presence of transaction costs that reduce returns for both lessees and lessors. 
Transaction costs include risk arising from a possible breach of the rental contract. 
Potential losses caused by a breach of contract can be reduced by introducing a credible 
third-party to witness the contract. Likewise, moral hazard can be reduced by contracting 
with trusted persons. Data from household surveys conducted in two communal areas of 
KwaZulu-Natal were used to estimate a regression model explaining levels of investment 
in crop production amongst tenant farmers. The results confirm that tenants invest more 
when they contract with friends or family, and if their contracts are formally witnessed by 
a credible third-party. Interventions that reduce potential losses caused by a breach of 
contract are therefore expected to promote market efficiency and investment in crop 
production. In the short-run, the Provincial Department of Agriculture should sanction 
rental contracts negotiated by lessors and lessees. Ultimately, legal reform that leads to 
predictable contract enforcement in the communal areas is required to improve market 
efficiency and levels of investment in agriculture.  
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South Africa’s racially biased pattern of land ownership was formalised in 1913 
by the Natives Land Act. This legislation restricted African land ‘ownership’ to 
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native reserves (and later, homelands) where the principal mode of tenure was 
‘customary’ and administered by traditional leaders (Lyne & Darroch, 2003). 
Today, an estimated 13 million black South Africans reside in these communal 
areas with 80% living in poverty (Turner & Ibsen, 2000:2). The communal areas of 
KwaZulu-Natal are characterized by intense population pressure and small farm 
sizes; rural households import the bulk of their staple foods yet relatively large 
tracts of cropland are left idle (Crookes & Lyne, 2001). One reason for the under-
utilisation of cropland is that there is little or no opportunity cost to penalise non-
use. An active rental market for cropland creates an opportunity cost for idle 
land, which is expected to improve allocative efficiency (Nieuwoudt, 1990). Long-
term research conducted in the communal areas of KwaZulu-Natal has shown 
that (a) rental markets for cropland are constrained by insecure land tenure and 
high transaction costs (Thomson & Lyne, 1993), (b) rental markets can be 
developed by adapting customary institutions (Lyne & Thomson, 1998) and (c) 
active rental markets tend to have both efficiency and equity advantages 
(Crookes & Lyne, 2003). Crookes & Lyne (2003) found that lessees applied 
seasonal inputs (fertilizer, seed and chemicals) at more than three times the rate 
applied by lessors. Lessors were relatively land rich but cash poor.  
 
The aim of this study is to test the hypothesis that an efficient rental market for 
cropland is a significant determinant of agricultural investment in the communal 
areas of KwaZulu-Natal. The efficiency of a rental market is compromised by the 
presence of transaction costs that reduce returns for both lessees and lessors. 
Transaction costs include risk arising from a breach of the rental contract. In 
KwaZulu-Natal where enforcement of land rental contracts by traditional courts 
is uncertain (Lyne & Thomson, 1998),  potential losses caused by a breach of 
contract can be reduced by introducing a credible third-party to witness the 
contract (Crookes & Lyne, 2001). Moral hazard can also be reduced by 
contracting with trusted persons. This study treats these attributes as indicators 
of relatively efficient contracts and combines them with other explanatory 
variables in a regression model of crop inputs purchased by tenant farmers 
identified in a survey of rural households drawn from two communal areas of 
KwaZulu-Natal.  
 
The next section of this paper traces the origins of the study and its data. Section 
3 outlines concepts of transaction costs and risk perceptions relevant to the rental 
market for cropland, and postulates a regression model to test the research 
hypothesis. Section 4 presents descriptive statistics and regression parameters 
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estimated from the sample data, and discusses the findings. The paper concludes 
with policy recommendations. 
 
2.   Background to the study and data  
 
This study uses data from a sample survey conducted by a team of staff and 
students from the University of KwaZulu-Natal in 2003. The survey assessed a 
programme implemented by Lima Rural Development Foundation (hereafter 
Lima) in 1999 to promote rental markets for cropland in the communal areas of 
two target districts, Bergville and Estcourt. Lima had been contracted by 
USAID/Pretoria to expand a research project undertaken by the University of 
Natal that showed how customary institutions could be adapted to improve 
tenure security, reduce transaction costs and create an active rental market for 
cropland. These adaptive strategies, detailed by Lyne & Thomson (1998), 
included the endorsement of rental contracts by a credible witness to facilitate 
contract enforcement in traditional courts. By 2002, Lima had extended the 
programme into six communal areas within the target districts. The aim of the 
survey was to examine the efficacy of Lima’s programmes in stimulating land 
rental markets for cropland, and to identify the efficiency and equity impacts of 
these markets. Households in these rural areas were generally characterized by 
large family sizes, poor education, high rates of unemployment and very low 
incomes 
 
The survey was conducted at two sites, one in each district, and included both 
Lima clients and non-clients. Random samples were drawn from lists of 
households at each site. For clients, the lists were extracted directly from records 
maintained by Lima. Non-clients were listed by matching each client with a non-
client neighbour identified by Lima staff. A total of 149 household heads were 
interviewed. Two questionnaires were unusable and scrapped. The remaining 
147 respondents were distributed almost equally between the survey sites. The 
survey was carried out over a period of approximately four months of which 15 
days were spent in the field interviewing respondents. A structured 
questionnaire elicited data on a wide variety of household demographics. 
Information relevant to this study was extracted from the survey data to estimate 
the parameters of an OLS regression model formulated to test the research 
hypothesis. This data subset comprised of 48 cases representing tenant farmers 
with valid observations on the variables included in the regression analysis. 
 
3.  Rental market efficiency and investment in crop production 




The following sections outline theoretical relationships between transaction costs, 
r i s k  p e r c e p t i o n s ,  e f f i c i e n c y  i n  t h e  l a n d  r e n t a l  m a r k e t  a n d  i n v e s t m e n t  i n  c r o p  
production. Indicators of relatively efficient rental transactions are identified and 
a regression model is postulated to explain levels of seasonal crop inputs applied 
by (48) tenant farmers in the sample of (147) households.  
 
3.1  Transaction costs and the rental market for cropland 
 
Transaction costs include the costs of defining and enforcing a contract (Randall, 
1972:16). It is convenient to classify transaction costs as ex ante or  ex post 
transaction costs (Williamson, 1985: 20). Ex ante transaction costs comprise 
mainly of fixed costs, which do not vary with volume traded, and arise from the 
search for and negotiation with potential trade partners. These costs affect the 
decision to participate in a rental transaction. Ex post transaction costs on the 
other hand, are variable costs that increase with the volume traded and which 
therefore affect the size of a transaction. Such costs include premiums associated 
with the risk of losses following a breach of contract. In the absence of integrity 
and trust, transactions must be monitored and policed and the more that is 
traded, the more there is to monitor and to be lost (Casson & Wadeson, 1998). 
Together,  ex ante and ex post transaction costs have the effect of limiting the 
incidence and size of transactions, i.e. limiting the number of transactions and 
area of land traded in rental markets, and may even preclude market 
participation altogether. 
 
Under customary law, a rental contract is sometimes regarded as evidence that 
the lessor does not need land; exposing the lessor to expropriation by the 
traditional authority should the lessee claim the land. Some forty per cent of 
respondents in previous surveys of rural households in KwaZulu claimed that 
they would lose their land if they rented it to other households (Lyne & Thomson, 
1998). Lyne & Thomson (1998) also report that prospective tenants were not 
convinced that traditional courts would uphold a long-term contract if the lessor 
decided to terminate the lease early. Respondents mentioned cases where lessors 
had reclaimed their land after the tenant had improved its fertility. These 
perceptions of risk inflate ex post transaction costs, driving a wedge between the 
offer price of tenants and the reservation price of lessors. Even if small farmers 
are not inherently risk averse (Binwanger, 1980), they could behave as if highly 
risk averse depending on the circumstances under which they operate. Moscardi 
& de Janvry (1977) found that risk-aversion coefficients estimated for small 
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farmers in Mexico diminished as farm size, liquidity, access to information and 
credit, and education increased. For the very small, poor and generally 
uneducated farmers in the communal areas of KwaZulu-Natal it seems likely that 
risk will constitute an important transaction cost constraining the rental market 
for cropland. Lima attempted to reduce risk by witnessing and endorsing written 
rental agreements negotiated by their clients. Rental contracts negotiated by non-
clients were not endorsed by a credible third-party. It was therefore anticipated 
that Lima clients would face lower ex post transaction costs than non-clients as 
they enjoyed greater assurance of contract enforceability.  
 
3.2  Regression model of tenant investment in crop production 
 
Investment in crop production is expected to increase in the presence of an active 
rental market. An obvious reason for this is that the market attaches an 
opportunity cost to under-utilised land, which tends to improve allocative 
efficiency by transferring land to farmers who are willing and able to use it. 
Another reason is that the market allows farmers to increase the scale of their 
operations, which - in the presence of size economies created by fixed transaction, 
information and management costs - strengthens incentives to invest. In this 
study, investment in agriculture is measured in terms of expenditure on fertiliser, 
seed, chemicals and labour used in crop production. Expenditure on operating 
inputs is an acceptable measure of investment when all of the respondents are 
tenant farmers with short-term rental contracts.  
 
Section 3.1 explained how risk arising from a possible breach of contract reduces 
both the incidence of transactions and quantities traded. Risk also influences the 
type of contract that is negotiated. Transactions tend to be highly personalised 
when the potential losses resulting from a breach of contract are high (Crookes & 
Lyne, 2001). In these circumstances, participants prefer to trade with family and 
friends as this reduces their exposure to moral hazard. Contracts witnessed by a 
credible authority also carry less risk as they are easier to enforce. Given the 
uncertainty surrounding enforcement of land rental contracts by traditional 
courts in KwaZulu-Natal, it was assumed that contracts formally witnessed by a 
credible third-party and those negotiated with family or friends would reduce 
risk. These attributes were treated as indicators of relatively efficient contracts 
and were therefore expected to impact positively on levels of operating inputs 
applied by tenant farmers.  
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Other variables expected to influence tenant investment in operating inputs 
included farmer education, liquidity and the quantity of family labour available 
for farm work. Following Welch (1978) it was anticipated that better educated 
farm managers would invest more in operating inputs as they are able to 
assemble and interpret information at a lower cost tha n  m a n a g e r s  w i t h  l e s s  
formal education. Liquidity is an obvious determinant of investment and several 
studies conducted in the communal areas of KwaZulu-Natal have identified low 
and irregular household income as a leading constraint to investment in farming 
(Fenwick & Lyne, 1999). For cash-strapped households, family labour could also 
be an important determinant of investment in yield increasing inputs. 
Households better endowed with on-farm family labour are expected to invest 
more in complementary inputs.    
 
The following regression model was postulated to explain levels of investment 
made by tenant farmers in the study areas. 
 
Investment = ƒ(Secure  rental  contract, Manager’s education, Household 
liquidity, Family farm labour)  
 
Given the data available, the parameters (βj) of the following regression function 
was estimated using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) procedure available on 
the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS, 2001): 
 
LNINVi   =  β0 + β1*LANDi + β2*WITNESSi  +  β3*FRIENDi + β4*EDUi + 
β5*LIQUIDi + β6*LABi + ui 
 
where; 
i    = 1….48 tenant farmers with valid observations on all variables, 
LNINV  = the natural log of Rands invested in fertilizer, chemicals, seed and 
labour, 
LAND  = hectares under maize, potato, beans and vegetables, a control 
variable to account for area induced differences in LNINV, 
WITNESS  = dummy variable, scoring 1 if Lima or the Department of 
Agriculture facilitated and formally witnessed the contract, and 0 if it 
was self facilitated, 
FRIEND  = dummy variable, scoring 1 if the contract was negotiated between 
family or friends, and 0 if it was negotiated between strangers, 
EDU  = dummy variable, scoring 1 if the household head progressed 
beyond primary school, and 0 otherwise, 
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LIQUID  = regular off-farm income (measured in Rand per month from wages 
and welfare grants), 
LAB  = number of household members able to participate in farming 
operations (farmers, housekeepers, unemployed labour force 
participants and one half of pensioners and children), 
u  = stochastic error term. 
 
The dependent variable was transformed to a natural logarithm (LNINV) as 
investment is not expected to increase at a constant rate with the explanatory 
variables. The parameter estimates therefore explain the percentage change in 
investment given a unit change in their respective explanatory variables. All 
explanatory variables were expected to have positive βj following the arguments 
presented earlier in this section. 
 
4.   Results and discussion 
 
This section presents descriptive statistics and regression parameters estimated 
from the sample data, and discusses the findings. 
 
4.1 Descriptive  statistics 
 
Table 1 highlights the small scale of farming (mean of only 2.09 hectares 
cultivated despite leasing additional land) and low levels of farmer education 
(less than 30 per cent had progressed beyond primary school). Average 
i n v e s t m e n t  i n  s e a s o n a l  c r o p  i n p u t s  ( I N V ) accounts for two-thirds of tenants’ 
mean annual wage and welfare income (LIQUID*12mths). Importantly, there is 
substantial variation to be explained in the level of investment. 
 






INV  2   31.95   
LAND  2.09   53.32   
WITNESS  0.73   8.90   
FRIEND  0.31   6.78   
EDU  0.29   22.89   
LIQUID  254.63   15.30   
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Table 2 shows that positive correlation exists between the explanatory variables 
and the dependent variable, lending support to the postulated model. There is no 
evidence of collinearity between explanatory variables as the largest absolute 
correlation coefficient in Table 2 is smaller than 0.5.  The variance inflation factors 
reported in Table 3 confirm that multicollinearity is not a problem in this sample 
(Gujarati, 2003:362). 
 
Table 2:  Correlation matrix of variables used in the OLS regression 
INV  1        
LAND 0.788**    1      
WITNESS  0.026  -0.119    1     
FRIEND  0.060 -0.063  -0.020    1     
EDU  0.108  -0.005   0.175 -0.083   1   
LAB  0.063    0.214 -0.083 -0.182 -0.190   1 
LIQUID 0.290*  0.328   0.104   0.045   0.102  -0.486** 
  INV LAND  WITNE FRIEND EDU  LAB 
Note: ** and * indicate significance at the 1% and 5% levels of probability respectively. 
 
4.2 Regression  results 
 
The results of the OLS regression analysis are presented in Table 3. The 
explanatory variables included in the empirical model account for 60 per cent of 
the total variation in LNINV, a ‘good fit’ for cross-sectional data. The positive 
signs of the estimated parameters (Bj) are consistent with a priori expectations. All 
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Table  3:  OLS regression results for investment in seasonal crop inputs 
(n=48) 
Unstandardised 
Coefficients  Explanatory 
variable 








(Constant)  7.098 0.199    35.585***   
LAND  0.057 0.008  0.685 7.081***  1.092 
WITNESS  0.283 0.143  0.197 1.979**  1.162 
FRIEND  0.201 0.132  0.146 1.523*  1.081 
EDU  0.036 0.138  0.026 0.262  1.138 
LIQUID  0.001 0.000  0.503 4.774***  1.295 
LAB  0.096 0.050  0.210 1.920**  1.403 
R2   
F 






Note: ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 10% and 15% levels of probability respectively. 
 
As expected, the parameter estimated for the control variable (LAND) is positive 
and highly significant, which is consistent with the view that rental transactions 
promote allocative efficiency. The parameter estimated for the dummy variable 
WITNESS is positive and statistically significant at the ten per cent level of 
probability. The finding that investment in operating inputs increases by 32.7 per 
cent (i.e. e0.283  – 1) when a rental contract is endorsed by a credible witness 
supports the argument that tenant farmers will invest more, ceteris paribus, when 
potential losses resulting from moral hazard are reduced by enhancing the 
enforceability of their rental contracts. Since this risk represents a variable 
transaction cost, it can be inferred that productivity in farming increases with 
improvements in the efficiency of the cropland rental market.  
 
A similar interpretation holds for the dummy variable FRIEND, for which the 
parameter estimate is statistically significant at the 15 per cent level of 
probability. The positive coefficient supports the view that tenant farmers invest 
more when moral hazard is reduced by contracting with trustworthy lessors, and 
hence that productivity in farming increases with improved efficiency in the 
cropland rental market. Summing their standardised regression coefficients, the 
variables WITNESS and FRIEND jointly contribute relatively more to levels of 
investment than does family labour. 
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The parameter estimated for LAB was statistically significant at the ten per cent 
level of probability, showing that an increase in the household’s stock of on-farm 
family labour adds to the level of its investment in operating inputs. Investment 
is predicted to grow by 9.6 per cent when the family’s stock of on-farm labour 
increases by one worker. This indicates a complementary relationship between 
family labour and yield increasing inputs like fertilizer and seed. It is also 
possible that the increase in investment could be attributed to a greater need to 
feed unemployed workers. LIQUID, the only other statistically significant 
explanatory variable considered in the model, is the most important determinant 
of per hectare investment in operating inputs. It is estimated that an additional 





Liquidity problems were identified as a serious constraint to investment in crop 
production, highlighting the familiar problems of low wage earnings, weak job 
skills, unemployment and poor access to agricultural credit. Investment is also 
constrained by the availability of family labour for farm work, suggesting that the 
liquidity problem is pervasive - even relatively cash rich households cannot hire 
sufficient farm labour. Such circumstances emphasise the importance of an 
efficient rental market to transfer under-utilised cropland to households that are 
willing and able to farm it. 
 
The results of this study support the view that a rental market for cropland does 
promote allocative efficiency, and that investment increased with efforts to 
reduce moral hazard and losses caused by a breach of the rental contract. It can 
be concluded that interventions which reduce the risk of losses caused by a 
breach of contract would promote market efficiency and investment in crop 
production. In the short-run external agents, like the Provincial Department of 
Agriculture, could reduce transaction costs in the rental market for cropland by 
sanctioning contracts negotiated by lessors and lessees. Ultimately, legal reform 
that leads to predictable contract enforcement in the communal areas is required 
to improve market efficiency and levels of investment in agriculture.  
 
These recommendations assume that individual property rights to cropland do 
not become less secure following implementation of the Communal Land Rights 
Act (CLaRA), Act 11 of 2004. Although the stated purpose of CLaRA is to provide 
for legal security of tenure by transferring communal land to communities, there 
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is no guarantee that the institutional arrangements adopted by communities will 
improve individual tenure security to cropland. This introduces an important 
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